Collusion between two-sided platforms
WebThis paper explores the welfare effects of coopetition between two-sided platforms in the context of a competitive bottleneck, i.e., when participants on one side of the market (the buyers) choose at most one platform (i.e., singlehome), while participants on the other side (the sellers) can be active on both platforms (i.e., multihome). Under coopetition, when … WebCollusion between two-sided platforms. Yassine Lefouili and Joana Pinho () . Post-Print from HAL. Abstract: We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most …
Collusion between two-sided platforms
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WebJun 30, 2024 · In this paper we apply a general model of one-sided and two-sided platform businesses to a collusive framework which we model as joint profit maximization. We have a particular interest in how the social loss and other metrics depend on the strength of the network (direct or indirect) effect. ... Keywords: Single- and Multi-Sided Platforms ... WebJan 1, 1983 · We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive …
WebWe study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp ... WebOct 10, 2024 · Abstract. This paper explores the incentives for, and the effects of, collusion in prices between two-sided platforms. We characterize the most profitable sustainable agreement when platforms collude on both sides of the market and when they collude on a single side of the market. Under two-sided collusion, prices on both sides are higher …
WebJun 1, 2024 · Related literature: It has been recognized for some time that collusion between two-sided platforms is a relevant real-world topic; for an informal discussion; … WebThe recent case in the meal vouchers market in France has put collusion in two-sided markets in the spotlight. This paper discusses the key insights from the recent literature …
WebApr 1, 2024 · A two-stage game model between duopoly platforms is established based on two-sided markets theory and game theory, the scale equilibrium, the price equilibrium and the profit equilibrium of ...
WebSimilarly, matching markets can be seen as two-sided in the sense that the matching “platform” (for instance, a dating service) is more 2 My view is not universal. Rochet and Tirole (2006) provide a technical definition in which a market is two-sided if the total quantity transacted depends not only on the per-unit fee extracted by the robyn thompson bootcampWebCollusion between two-sided platforms nation of the optimal mechanism is outside the scope of the paper, we believe that most, if not all, of the main insights about the price effects of collusion would carry over to the case where firms would use such a mechanism. First, note that the scope for perfect col- lusion is larger with the optimal ... robyn thompson\u0027s instant cashWebJun 1, 2024 · 1. Introduction. Markets with two-sided platforms featuring positive cross-group network effects and non-differentiated services have the tendency that one … robyn thompson methodWebMartin Peitz & Lily Samkharadze, 2024. "Collusion Between Non-differentiated Two-Sided Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_331, University of … robyn thompsonWebDownloadable (with restrictions)! We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs … robyn thompson naturopathWebThe distinction between perfect and imperfect two-sided collusion turns out to be crucial, for instance, for the e ects of cross-group externalities on the harm su ered by the agents using the platforms. Second, in the context of one-sided collusion, Ruhmer (2011) focused on the pro tability robyn thompson goggsWebTwo-sided platforms enable the interaction between 2 types of agents. Several examples of collusion in newspapers: US, Venezuela, Brazil, etc. Aim: Analyze incentives for and effects of collusion between two platforms. Two horizontally differentiated platforms. Allow for any degree of collusion. Infinitely repeated game (dynamic setting). robyn toft